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Stalin-Note 1952
 «  7 Die "relative Offenheit" der USA vor der 2. westl. Antwortnote vom 13. Mai 1952  » 

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Dokument 10
Aufzeichnung von Louis H. Pollak über eine Besprechung im Büro von Paul Nitze betr. freie Wahlen in Deutschland vom 11. April 1952
Urheber
Louis H. Pollak
Datum
11.04.1952
Bestand/Sign.
National Archives, Washington (D.C.), RG 59, Records of the Policy Planning Staff 1947‑ 1953, country and area files, Germany, Box 16 (Durchschrift)

Those present at the meeting were: Mr. Nitze Mr. Ferguson Mr. Tufts Mr. Jessup Mr. Scammon
  I. Messrs. Tufts and Scammon outlined a proposal for testing the possibilities of free elec­tions in Germany, not through »investigation of conditions«, but through the actual in­itiation, with Soviet agreement, of free political campaigning throughout Germany. The premise of the proposal was that the only »condition« relevant to the holding of free elections is actual Soviet willingness to hold such elections. Accordingly, we would propose to the Soviets - perhaps in the exchange of notes, or per­haps in the course of conversations, arising out of the notes, as to the feasibility of free elections - that as of a given date, free political campaigning be initiated throughout Germany. This would mean opening the borders and allowing adherents of all political parties to wander without restrictions through the entire territory - canvassing, driving sound trucks, holding political meetings, etc. It was felt that, if the USSR agreed to the proposal, we (and, more importantly, the West Germans) would be able to tell within a few days, and perhaps even within a few hours of the starting date, whether the Soviet Union really meant busi­ness.
The index of whether they meant business would be the very simple fact of whether the ad­herents and organizers of West German political parties were actually able to campaign without hindrance throughout the Soviet Zone. It was also felt that we would be able fully to reciprocate by guaranteeing in the Western Zone the full freedom we would insist on in the Soviet Zone - i.e., in the Western Zone the only restrictions would be dietated by the maintenance of law and order (aside from prohibitions on entry into certain narrowly defined military areas). In brief, the criteria of whether free elections were possible would be quite simple:
1. Complete freedom of campaigning and organization as indicated above. (As to this it was felt that the freedom accorded the SPD would be the decisive index of Soviet intentions; the USSR would be much more concemed about the efforts of the SPD, which would be aimed at the East German proletariat, than about the efforts of the »bourgeois« parties to the right of the SPD.)
2. Freedom from reprisals; it would be essential that the population of the Soviet Zone be able to support West German political parties without fear of Communist reprisals - but an estimate of the degree of fulfillment of this criterion might not be immediately obtainable.

On the question of inspection of the campaign process by the UN Commission or a com­mission of the four powers, it was felt that inspection machinery was not essential from a practical point of view, in as much as the members of the SPD and other Western parties operating in the Soviet Zone would determine the facts for themselves (and for West German opinion) with no difficulty. It was felt that such inspection would be desirable, how­ever, from a general propaganda point of view; that it would be desirable for East German morale if there were a considerable show of having inspection teams circulating freely; and that it would be desirable, in the event of disputes, that there be a UN or four power inspec­tion system which would be able to make official findings. (Retention of the inspection de­vice would, of course, maintain desirable consistency with our present insistence that a UN or quadripartite commission investigate the possibilites of free elections.)
II. The elaboration of the above scheme for a pragmatic test of Soviet intentions regarding free elections provoked tactical   discussion of the relationship of the free elections prob­lem to the general problem of German integration and/or unification.

The basic case for testing the genuineness of Soviet intentions was put by Messrs. Ferguson and Nitze on the grounds that (1) at any time that the USSR is really willing to hold free elections and get out of East Germany it can block German integration, and (2) if German integration is going to be blocked by the USSR, we ought to find that out as soon as possible and plan our future European policy accordingly. On the other hand, if the Soviet Union is not willing to hold free elections, the Soviet response to the proposal outlined above would demonstrate that fact to the West Germans dramatically and conciusively. The West would gain considerable propaganda advantage from having thus taken the initiative on the free elections question, and the demonstration of Soviet unwillingness to hold free elections would accelerate West German integration.
Mr. Jessup was dubious about the timing of such a proposal, wondering whether it would not be better to spring such an idea after the si gning and perhaps the ratification of the contractuals and the EDC Treaty.
Mr. Ferguson stressed the idea that the failure to make an offer of the kind indicated would contribute to delay the signing of the contractuals and the EDC Treaty. He and Mr. Scam­mon reiterated the idea that ratification of these agreein~rits was merely the beginning of the integration process, and that for whatever length of time we falled to test the genuine­ness of Soviet intentions the Soviet Union would retain the power to halt integration.
Mr. Jessup pointed out to the group the strong feeling of many in the Department that we should take no present step which would divert the attention of the West Germans from the immediate task of getting the contractuals and the EDC Treaty signed and ratified.
There than followed some discussion, initiated by Mr. Nitze, of the conditions which must in our judgement obtain in Germany in the interim period between the establishment of an all-German government and the signing of the peace treaty. Mr. Nitze felt that we had to insist on the withdrawal, in the interim period, of Soviet occupation forces and the Soviet AGs. Mr. Nitze felt that there had not been enough study in the Department of precisely what conditions should prevail during that period, but pointed to the great difficulties we would encounter if we were to permit anything like a repetition of the Austrian situation. Mr. Scammon recalled that a study of the problem had been made when he was in Germany some years back, and he will try to find a copy of it. Meanwhile, Mr. Nitze is thinking of having R prepare an estimate of the reaction of Western Germany to varlous hypothesized Soviet positions on conditions surrounding unification.




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