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Stalin-Note 1952
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Dokument 8

Memorandum von Richard. M. Scammon und Robert W. Tufts für Paul Nitze, vom 14. März 1952

Urheber

Richard. M. Scammon und Robert W. Tufts

Datum

14.03.1952

Bestand/Sign.

National Archives, Washington (D. C), RG 59, Records of the Policy Planning Staff 194 7‑ 1953, country and area files, Germany, Box 16

Auszug aus dem Memorandum von Richard. M. Scammon und Robert W. Tufts, Mitglieder des Politischen Planungsstabes, für Paul Nitze, Leiter des Politischen Planungsstabes im State Department, vom 14. März 1952 (Top Secret) National Archives, Washington (D. C), RG 59, Records of the Policy Planning Staff 194 7‑ 1953, country and area files, Germany, Box 16

Outline of factors bearing on the Western reply to the Soviet note on Germany

I. The Soviet Purpose

A.	We do not know, of course, the real motivation of the Soviet note. There is general agreement, however, that it should be taken seriously, both because it has the ring of considered policy rather than propaganda and because it omits, superficially at least, demands for four power control of Germany and the Ruhr on which the Russians have been insistent heretofore and apparently reverses the previous Soviet positions on German armed forces and military production. The Russians probably believe that their move can be exploited in more than one way - in other words, the purpose for which the move will in fact be exploited is partly dependent on our reaction. We should keep the possibility in mind that the Russians:
	1.	might be willing to negotiate a German settlement on this basis,-
	2.	might be trying to influence the Germans to go slow on the integration of Western Germany into the Western system;
	3.	might be trying to involve the Western powers in endless negotiations a la Panmunjom - as a means of blocking Western Germany's integration into the Western system and thus Western European integration in general;
	4.	might be trying to lay a basic political position which they feel they can live with over a long period and which they can profitably exploit over the long term;
	5.	might be laying the political basis for an early major shift in Soviet policy, not necessarily related to Germany alone. What such a shift might be is anybody's guess: it might range from a policy of preparation for a long contest in the West, beginning with a relaxation of tensions on European questions, through consolidation of the Soviet system by a new effort to evict the Western powers from Berlin, all the way to aggressive action probably involving war.

II. The Purpose ofthe Western Response

A.	Broadly speaking, we want to respond in such a way as:
	1.	to avoid the traps and pitfalls, if any (and there almost certainly are)
	2.	to run a litmus test on Soviet intentions; and
	3.	to push, if possible, towards our objectives with respect to Germany, Western Europe, and the Soviet system.
B.	Broadly speaking, there are four possible types of Western response:
	1.	Outright rejection.
	2.	A propaganda-type rejection (i.e., renewed expressions of the Western desire for German unity and a German peace treaty accompanied by conditions which are designed to appear as plausible as possible and to be unacceptable to the Russians).
	3.	Request for clarification.
	4.	Counter-proposals designed to call the Soviet hand (i.e., to make the Soviets decide whether to proceed promptly with the creation of an all-German Government and possibly with the withdrawal of forces or to indicate that they will not so proceed).
C.	Traps and Pitfalls. Outright or propaganda rejection might lead us straight into a Soviet trap. It must be presumed that the Soviet rulers have considered the possibility that we will reject their proposals and have a plan for exploiting such a Western counter-move. Whatever their desired aim is, they could exploit a Western rejection by trying to influence the Germans along the lines indicated in I. A.2 above or laying a political foundation along the lines indicated in I. A.4 and 5. The most obvious and probably the immediate aim of the Russians is to elicit a request for clarification, to which they could respond in such a way as to make it very difficult for us to avoid negotiations, with their further aims dependent in large part on the course of the negotiations. This is the most obvious purpose because their note is not an easy one to reject as mere propaganda or old stuff. It is probably their immediate purpose because it offers not only short-term advantages in delaying action by the West but also preserves the opportunity for realizing long-term advantages if the Western position in negotiations provides any openings of this kind.
D.	A Test of Soviet Intentions. A request for clarification will probably not give us a clear and early test of Soviet intentions, no matter how carefully it is worded. We might eventually learn what we want to know but only after long negotiations, which we want to avoid. A quick test of Soviet intentions can probably be obtained only by a counter-proposal specifically designed to call the Soviet hand. It goes without saying that it will be extremely difficult to draft a satisfactory counter-proposal. This problem is taken up in Section IV of this memorandum. What is clear is that if a counter-proposal is made, it must be one with which we can live and which will, if possible, advance us, whether accepted or rejected by the Soviet Union, toward our obj ectives.

III. Western Objectives

A.	lf a Western counter-proposal is rejected by the Soviet Union, the Soviet reaction should greatly assist us in making progress on our present policies in Western Europe. It would again demonstrate that German unity is not a real alternative to our present policies and underline once more the phoneyness of Soviet proposals. Soviet rejection is the probable outcome of our move - if that move is well planned. The recent national intelligence estimate, which OIR endorses, reaches the conclusion that the Soviet Union is not willing at this time to sacrifice its position in Eastern Germany for the sake of possible long-run advantages with respect to Germany as a whole.
B.	Nevertheless, if a counter-proposal is made, there is an off chance that it will be accepted by the Russians. The question which immediately arises is whether a settlement on the basis of a unified, independent, and neutral Germany is consistent with our objectives.
C.	This leads to the following questions:
	1.	Are we likely to have success in carrying out our present policies if in addition to our present difficulties we add whatever difficulties would be caused by rejection of the Soviet proposals? It is only by rejection that we can be sure that we will not be trapped into frustrating negotiations or into a settlement on the basis of a unified Germany, with all that that implies. In answering this question, we must bear in mind that we have been having great difficulties and that great difficulties loom ahead in France and Germany and elsewhere on the continent. Rejection of the Soviet proposals would intensify these difficulties. The probable result would be, at best, even more halting rate of progress toward our present goals than we have been making and, at worst, a stymie. However, halting progress and perhaps even a stymie would be preferable to a basically unsound European situation. Would a settlement on the basis of a unified, independent, and neutral Germany create such a situation or would it be consistent with U.S. interests, and, if so, under what circumstances? We have to consider this question even though we estimate that the chances of a German settlement on this basis are probably not more than one in ten.
D.	The Consequences ofa settlement involving a unified, independent, and neutral Germany. The United States would be confronted with a choice between two major lines of development of its European policy. First, we might seek to maintain NATO and undertake to align Germany's interests with the West or at least with the maintenance of its independence from the Soviet Union. Second, nie might seek to develop a unified Western Europe which would, as a bloc, play a strong neutral role and revise NATO so that the U.S. and U.K. guaranteed the security of the bloc without receiving reciprocal guarantees.
	1.	Maintenance of NATO. It is possible that the French reaction to a unified, independent, and neutral Germany would be an even greater interest in the maintenance and development of NATO than it now has. It is most unlikely that Germany would, so long as it remained weak, make a deal with the Soviet Union. The more likely development, and one which should be able to assist indirectly, is that Germany would seek to develop enough strength to gain, in light of its recognition of our interests in preventing its domination by the Soviet Union, a sense of security. If this came about, there would then indeed be the possibility of deals with the Soviet Union, but these would be deals which Germany would conclude only if they improved its position visa-vis the Soviet Union. There might be a real advantage, in terms of our long tun interests with respect to the Soviet Union and to world peace, in having an independent Germany which could so negotiate with the Soviet Union, for in this case the Soviet Union might not be as reluctant to make concessions to Germany as to a united and in in [sic!] its view necessarily hostile Western bloc which included Germany. On the whole it is probably in the long run interest of the U.S. if new power centers can be established and if the present East-West conflict can be replaced by an interplay of interests between several power centers. We need not fear Germany so long as we maintain a strong atomic capability.
	2.	Western European Unification. Alternatively, it might be possible to push forward with the creation of a new Western European power center, which would not be formally allied to the U.S. and the U.K., but which, for a variety of reasons, would be impelled to remain on friendly terms with us and to concentrate its available energies on improving the security of its position in the East. This would involve the alteration of NATO from a reciprocal undertaking to a pledge by the U.S. and the U.K. to regard an attack on Western Europe as an attack on themselves. Such a development would also be consistent with our long-term interests. Which of these two lines we could and should follow would depend largely on the preferences of the continental countries, especially France and Germany.
E.	It should be emphasized once again that the probable results of a Western counter-proposal will be, first, to reveal that the Soviet Union is, at the moment, bluffing and thus, second to assist us in moving ahead with our present policies. Furthermore, even if the Soviet Union should be willing to make a German settlement, it seems unlikely that it will be willing to make one in the near future. The Soviet Union may see its choice as one between a German settlement and a preventive war, but it probably does not regard this as a choice which has to be made urgently. It may feel that the choice depends largely on the terms it could get for a German settlement. From this it is concluded that we should respond to the Soviet note in a way which indicates that we prefer a German settlement to war, if the terms of settlement are reasonable, but our price should be high enough to reflect confidence in the basic strength of our general position and the basic weakness of the Soviet position in Germany.
F.	If we go down this course, it will be of the greatest importance to move as rapidly as possible on the contractual arrangements and the EDC-EDF arrangements, for it is only by demonstrating that we have a real alternative that we can effectively put pressure on the Soviet Union (whose alternatives are less favorable) to negotiate a German settlement.

IV. Form of a Reply to the Note of the USSR

The essence of our reply to the Soviet note of 10 March should be as follows:
1.	This Government welcomes the suggestions of the Soviet Government with respect to preparing in the nearest future an agreed draft peace treaty with Germany.
2.	This Government agrees with the Soviet Government's view that any such agreed peace treaty must be worked out with direct participation of Germany in the form of an allGerman Government.
3.	In order to further the desires of the Soviet Government to proceed with discussions of such a treaty in the nearest future, this Government proposes that steps be undertaken immediately to organize the holding of democratic all-German elections on Sunday, November 16, 1952, or on such other similar date as mäy be agreed, to select an all-German Constituent Assembly.
4.	In the organization of these elections this Government proposes that the laws, ordinances, administrative orders, and regulations concerning the election of the German Constituent Assembly of 1919 be applied, with the addition of a system of four-power control comparable to that employed in the Berlin city elections of October, 1946. To provide appropriate four-power responsibility in this matter, this Government proposes that the three High Commissioners of Great Britain, France, and this Government join with the head of the Soviet Control Commission not later than April 1, 1952, to establish such authority as may be deemed advisabie for these purposes.
5.	Lest there be any misunderstanding of the firm intention of the responsible powers to proceed resolutely to the election of a democratic German Constituent Assembly, this Government proposes that each power guarantee in its zone the terms of paragraphs three and four of the political provisions of the Soviet Government's draft treaty of 10 March, namely - (3) Democratic rights must be guaranteed to the German people to the end that all persons under German jurisdiction without regard to race, Sex, language, or religion enjoy the rights of man and the basic freedoms including freedom of speech, press, religious persuasion, political conviction, and assembly. (4) Free activity of democratic parties and organizations must be guaranteed in Germany with the right of freedom to decide their own internal affairs, to conduct meetings and assembly, to enjoy freedom of press and publication.
6.	This Government is prepared to presume that the implementation of paragraph five above will be in effect from April 1, 1952. Should any of the powers concerned fail to guarantee these terms in its zone of responsibility, this Government would feel that the other participating powers would automatically be freed from any further commitments with respect to the holding of an election to an all-German Constituent Assembly. Should any of the powers concerned not maintain the guarantees envisaged in paragraph five above after the holding of elections to the all-German Constituent Assembly, this Government would feel that such failure would be an effective cancellation of the elections and would automatically dissolve the Constituent Assembly.

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