Memorandum von Robert W. Tufts, Mitglied des Politischen Planungsstabes, für Paul H. Nitze, Leiter des Politischen Planungsstabes im State Department, vom 12. März 1952 (Top Secret) National Archives, Washington (D. C), RG 59, Records of the Policy Planning Staff 1947-1953, country and area files, Germany, Box 16

Comments on Soviet Note regarding Germany

I believe that the Soviet Union has provided us with an opportunity to seize the diplomatic initiative and that we and out French and British allies should move boldly to exploit this opportunity.

Stripped to its fundamentals, the method of exploitation would be the following:

(1) We would generally endorse the stated purposes of the Soviet Union with reference to the formation of an all-German Government and the conclusion of a peace treaty and agree that these steps would strengthen peace.

(2) We would agree to early negotiations (beginning, say, May 1) concerning the electoral and other conditions under which an all-German Government will be created, subject to prior agreement:

(a) that the necessary elections will be held not later than, say, November 1 (I think the date should be one late in the fall) whether or not agreement is reached in the nego­tiations;

(b) that unless the four powers agree on the electoral and other conditions by, say, September 1, each power guarantees to enforce in its zone the terms of paragraphs 3 and 4 of the political provisions of the Soviet draft treaty and each power guarantees that representatives of each party participating in the election will participate at each stage of the ballot counting process. (The paras. referred to guarantee »democratic rights« to all Germans »including freedom of speech, press, religious persuasion, political conviction and assembly« and »free activity of democratic parties and organizations with right of freedom to decide their own internal affairs, to conduct meetings and assembly, to enjoy freedom of press and publication.«)

(3) We would agree to early negotiations concerning the terms of peace (beginning concurrently with the negotiations concerning the formation of an all-German Government), subject to prior agreement on: 

(a) an immediate reduction of occupation forces. We should propose a 2 to 1 or at most a 3 to 2 ratio between Western and Soviet forces, with a maximum of, say 200 to 250 thousand in the West;

(b) the withdrawal of remaining occupation forces by May 1, 1953 (i. e., within one year after the beginning of negotiations), with not less than one-fourth of the total being withdrawn each quarter;

(c) the right of the all-German Government to raise and equip a national police force of, say 300,000 men pending agreement on the treaty provisions regarding German armed forces and military production, the police forces to be permitted the equipment normally in use in the police forces of major states and

(d) the right of the all-German Government to exercise full sovereignty after May 1, 1953, subiect to the terms of the peace treaty, or, lf the treaty has not been concluded by that time, subiect to the requirement that the development of German armed forces and the entrance into milltary alliances must be approved by the four powers and subject to such other agreed directives as the four powers issue to the German Government.

It would be our expectation that the Soviet reaction to this put-up-or-shut-up approach would in effect be to reject the proposals. If this is the reaction, it should strengthen the view in Western Europe that present Western policies are correct and that unification of Ger­many is not a real alternative because of Soviet policy.

We would have to be prepared, however, for the contingency that the Soviet Government accepts our proposals. A careful study of the probable consequences should be prepared as a matter of urgency. It is my belief that the position of the West would be improved, and the position of the Soviet Union weakened. This belief rests on the following judgments, the ac­curacy of which should, of course, be reviewed. In the first place, I assume that the all-Ger­man Government would be strongly anti-communist. Secondly, we would have accom­plished first withdrawal of Soviet control from a territory which had been under Soviet mili­tary occupation. It would be, in my view, at least as significant and probably much more sig­nificant in the long run than the Yugoslav development. Thirdly, while certain revisions of our policy in Europe would be necessary, I believe that it would still be possible to move ahead with the formation of a Western European community, including Germany, on a basis that would serve U. S. interests and that would not, or rather, I suppose, should not give rise to French fears. By the same token I think we would have seriously setback any ex­pansionist plans of the Soviet Union in Western Europe. Fourthly, I believe we would be en­abled to pursue a bolder policy in the Far East with less risk.

Opposition to this course should be expected from Adenauer, who would fear that the SPD would win control of a unified Germany. It is my own belief, however, that even if Ade­nauer's estimate is correct, Germany will be more likely to develop as a strong and effective anti-communist force under the SPD than under right wing leadership. We may, in any event, be confronted with an SPD victory next year, with all that that [sic!] might involve for our present policy in Western Europe. I would emphasize to Adenauer the small chance of Soviet acceptance to the U. S. proposals and the resulting benefits he should expect.

Opposition should probably also be expected from the French, who would fear that an inde­pendent Germany could be successfully wooed by the Soviet Union or could successfully develop once again a position of strength. I would emphasize to the French (as to Adenauer) the small chance of Soviet acceptance and would attempt to reassure the French by reference to NATO, to the limitations on German rearmament and German alliances which would be included in a peace treaty, and to the possibilities for moving ahead with renewed vigor on European political and economic institutions.